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Policy makers across the world are trying to improve the performance of the
education system. Reforms have centred around ideas which the economics
literature has identi…ed as essential in in‡uencing the performance of com-
mercial organisations, such as the provision of incentives linking individuals’
monetary reward to their performance and the creation of vestigial forms of
competition between institutions.
There are however fundamental di¤erences between commercial organ-
isations and educational institutions.1 The lack of a monetary measure
for the performance of an education institution is an obvious one, but, no
less importantly, education establishments (schools and universities) use a
customer-input technology (Rothschild and White 1993, 1995): the charac-
teristics of the users of an educational institution, that is of its customers,
a¤ect the quality of its output. This is true both of the pupils’ ability,2 and
of the e¤ort they exert while at school.3
The aim of the paper is to illustrate the consequences of these features
of the education production process on the way incentive schemes and com-
petitive mechanisms operate. We study the interaction between schools,
students, and employers. Employers form expectations on the ability of the
school leavers, and o¤er them a wage which depends on this expectation.
Schools, and their teachers, make investments; these in‡uence the schools’
results, both directly and indirectly, by attracting abler students. Last but
not least, the students themselves exert e¤ort while at school, thus a¤ecting
1An exhaustive discussion of the distinctive economic features of the education industry
is in Winston (1999).
2This is known as the “peer group” e¤ect: students learn better if they are in a group
of abler students. This is a reasonably well documented phenomenon, see Moreland and
Levine (1992) for a survey from a psychology/education viewpoint, and Summers and
Wolfe (1977), Henderson et al. (1978) for early economic empirical studies and Epple
et al. (2000) and Zimmer and Toma (2000) for more recent ones. From a theoretical
viewpoint, the analyses of Arnott and Rowse (1987) and de Bartolomé (1990) were among
the …rst to take the peer group e¤ect explicitly into account.
3Empirical studies rarely include students’ e¤ort as an independent input in the edu-
cation production function: this is probably due to the di¢culty of obtaining independent
measures of e¤ort. The one exception we are aware is Bønnesronning’s (1998) study of
Norwegian schools. His analysis provides positive and signi…cant estimates of student ef-
fort on student achievement. Also he …nds that students e¤ort is a¤ected both by school
factors and family characteristics. At a theoretical level, the literature is equally scarce;
the one analysis we are aware of is the undeservingly little noticed paper by Correa and
Gruver (1987).
1their own quali…cation. As the paper shows, the interaction among these
groups of agents is very complex, and it is shaped powerfully, and in often-
unexpected ways, by the environment created by the incentive mechanisms
and the competitive framework in which schools operate. Both of which are
of course shaped by government policy.
Students maximise their expected future earnings, reduced by the cost
of e¤ort, and employers maximise expected pro…ts. If these objectives are
canonical within economic theory, there is no standard choice for the objec-
tive function of schools. The assumption of this paper is that a school aims
at maximising the average quali…cation of its students, reduced by the in-
vestment cost.4 As any teacher knows, this is realistic and plausible, even in
the absence of any explicit mechanism linking pay to performance. However,
government policy can strengthen the importance of a school’s results in the
school’s objective function, for example by explicitly linking the teachers’
remuneration and chances of promotions with the results obtained by the
pupils at their school.5
In Section 3, we study the benchmark case of an isolated school. We
show that the theoretical link between the provision of incentives and the
educational output is ambiguous: more powerful incentives may have the
perverse e¤ect of lowering the e¤ort exerted by the students .
In Section 4, we study two competing schools. Introducing competition,
typically by freeing parents from the rigid link between their residence and
the school attended by their children, is a major plank of many reform
proposals, including those referred to in footnote 5. While there are some
theoretical analyses of the role of competition between state and private
4Size may of course also matter. We prefer to concentrate on students’ results and
therefore we …x exogenously the size of the schools we consider.
5 There are many examples. In several US states and districts teachers are o¤ered
bonuses and/or salary increases for meeting or exceeding academic objectives (as an ex-
ample, a pilot programme in Denver, Colorado, involving 15 schools and 450 teachers
who could receive up to $1,500 in bonuses, based on (i) increases in student performance
on standardised tests, (ii) increases in student performance on teacher-developed assess-
ments, and (iii) increases in teachers’ skills and knowledge; see BRT and NAB 2001). This
principle has been enshrined in the US blueprint for school reform (US Congress 2002).
In the UK, the Labour government is implementing a performance related pay system
for teachers and head teachers (see www.dfee.gov.uk/teachers). In the Australian state
of Victoria, union and the state government agreed in 2001 to link teachers’ promotions
to improvements in student learning monitoring via state-wide testing (Victorian Govern-
ment 2001). Interesting policy experiments were conducted in Israel recently which aimed
to measure the responsiveness of students results to …nancial incentives for groups (Lavy
2002a) and for individual teachers (Lavy 2002b).
2schools (for example Epple and Romano’s (1998) analysis of the e¤ects of a
vouchers scheme), and empirical analyses of the e¤ects of competition both
between state and private institutions and for institution within the public
sector,6theoretical analyses of competition within the public sector are rare.7
In Section 4.1, we assume that schools try to attract high ability pupils.
They can do so both by improving their teaching environment and by under-
taking activities that do not improve the quality of their teaching; examples
are “marketing” expenditures, mail shots, fairs, brochures, open days, and
so on, and the administration of interviews and admission tests. And, as
our examples show, it may well happen that an increase in the power of
the incentives scheme has the perverse e¤ect of a reduction in the average
quali…cation obtained by the students.
The e¤ectiveness of the competitive mechanism may also have ambiguous
e¤ects on the schools’ result. When the students become more responsive
to changes in the schools, schools devote more e¤ort to recruiting them,
increasing the marginal cost of teaching e¤ort, thus reducing the latter and
the students’ attainment.
An important factor in‡uencing parents’ preference for schools is the
reputation created by the past performance.8 The simple dynamic model
based on this idea in Section 4.2 shows that reputation can be self perpetu-
ating: abler children attend the school which performed better in the past,
and because this school has abler pupils, it will also perform better in the
future, and so on. However, the e¤ects of reputation on the student-teacher
interaction are ambiguous. It may happen that the “better” school (namely
the school with superior results) is in fact the school where students and
teachers work less hard: results are better simply because abler students are
enrolled. Competition also creates segregation by ability: the gaps in aver-
age ability between the two schools and in their result increase as parental
6For example, Borland and Howsen (1992), Hoxby (1994), and Dee (1998), show
that additional competition from private schools improve outcomes for students in public
schools in the US. Hoxby (2000) shows that schools choice in the US raises school produc-
tivity. Bradley et al. (2001) show that, over the period 1993-1998, competition among
secondary state schools in the UK led to increases in e¢ciency.
7De Fraja and Iossa (2002) study the case of competition between two not-for-pro…t
universities located in di¤erent towns.
8In the UK, the government has published all the state schools results in a variety of
dimensions. Several newspapers use this data to construct highly popular –and in‡uential–
“League Tables” of the various schools. Gibbons and Machin (2002) have documented the
e¤ects of the rankings obtained form these tables on house prices in England and Wales.
3choice becomes more responsive to past results.
One interpretation of our results illustrating ambiguous e¤ects of incen-
tive schemes is that they may provide an explanation for empirical studies
which suggest that additional investment in schools resources may not have
an impact of results.9 To the extent that more powerful incentives are
costly – which is the case if teachers are risk averse –, then, according to
our analysis, an increase in the power of incentive schemes increases the re-
sources available to schools, while having ambiguous e¤ects on performance.
In a naive view of the world, ceteris paribus, additional resources would im-
prove results; but, if the additional resources also a¤ect the trade-o¤s of the
agents participating in the education process, their actions will also change,
and therefore the assumption of ceteris paribus cannot be warranted, and
the full analysis must also include the potentially o¤setting e¤ects operating
indirectly via the actions of teachers and students.
The paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, we present the actors of
the model: students, schools, and employers. Section 3 studies the bench-
mark case of a monopoly school. In Section 4.1 we study the interaction
between two schools, which can use resources to attract students. Finally
in Section 4.2, we consider a simple model of dynamic interaction between
schools, where demand for places responds to past results. Concluding re-
marks are in Section 5.
2 The model
We study the education system of an economy. This comprises three groups
of agents: students, schools and employers. They are described in detail in
the subsections below.
2.1 Students
There is a continuum of individuals in the economy, identical in every re-
spect except their ability. This is measured by a unidimensional parame-
ter µ 2 £ µ I R+, distributed according to a di¤erentiable function ©(µ),
9Hanushek (1986) is an in‡uential early survey. More recently, similar result are ob-
tained by Betts (1995), Heckman et al (1996), and Dearden et al. (1997). Some of these
studies are analysed by Card and Krueger, who conclude that “there is some evidence that
school resources a¤ect earnings and educational attainment, although much uncertainty
remains in the literature” (1998, pp. 39).




All individuals attend school, and, subsequently, enter the labour market.
When at school, they exert e¤ort e 2 E µ I R+. This measures how diligent
she is, how hard she works and so on; it also includes parental e¤ort, such
as checking homework. e has a utility cost measured by a function Ã(e),
increasing and convex, Ã0(e);Ã00 (e) > 0. We assume that, while at school,
and, therefore, when they choose their e¤ort, students know the ability
distribution of the students’ enrolled at their school, but not their own
ability. This tallies with the idea that the education process is one of the
ways in which we learn our ability. The advantage of this speci…cation is that
all students in a given school exert the same level of e¤ort (which simpli…es
the analysis and would not necessarily happen if students knew their own
ability).10
A student leaves school with a quali…cation, described in detail in Sec-
tion 2.2, and enters the labour market. Here, she receives a wage, which
depends on the employers’ expectation of her productivity, which in turn
depends on her quali…cation and the employers’ inference about her ability.
This is derived below, in Section 2.4. A student’s objective function is the
maximisation of the di¤erence between expected future wage and current
e¤ort.
2.2 Schools
Students attend school and leave with a quali…cation. This is a variable q
taking values in a continuum:11 q 2 Q µ I R+. The realised value of q is
10A more realistic assumption could entail dividing the entire ability set £ in subsets,
(for example, low, medium, and high ability), and positing that students know which sub-
set they are in, but not the exact value of their ability. This would imply that all students
in the same interval exert the same e¤ort level, and would add additional complexity with
no added insight. At the opposite extreme, we could have assumed that students only
know the ability distribution in the economy. This would make no di¤erence: the stan-
dard requirement of subgame perfection implies that, in equilibrium, agents understand
the game played by the schools and can therefore deduct the ability distribution in each
school, even though they cannot observe it directly.
11It should be noted that, in some cases, quali…cation is adiscrete variable (for example,
in the UK, A/B/C/D/E/F at school and I/IIi/IIii/III/Ordinary at university). Even when
the quali…cation is discrete, it is often the case that institutions make it …ner in uno¢cial
ways (such as providing a transcript of the examination marks, writing reference letters
which specify the “quality” of a student’s degree, giving the rank in her cohort, and so
on).
5a¤ected by four factors.
The …rst two may di¤er from individual to individual: her e¤ort while
at school, e, and her ability, µ. The other two characterise the school and
take the same value for all the students at a given school i: the quality of
the teaching si 2 S µ I R+, and the average ability of the students in the
school, µi. The latter captures the “peer group e¤ect”. The variable si, on
the other hand, captures the idea that a school can make investments which
a¤ects its quality. The nature of the school’s investments is quite complex.
We posit that they can be of three conceptually distinct types, depending on
their timing and on their e¤ects. Speci…cally, part of a schools’ investment
is constituted by activities which are …xed before the students are enrolled
at school and have therefore the feature of a durable investment. These can
themselves be divided into two parts; some of it improves the quality of the
school’s teaching: the quality of buildings, classroom equipment, computers,
sporting facilities, teachers’ quali…cations and so on. A second part does not
directly a¤ect the quali…cation of its students: in this category belong expen-
ditures which are aimed towards student recruitment, such as advertisement
brochures, the organisation of visits for prospective pupils and their parents,
and generally what can be classi…ed as “marketing” in a wider sense. The
third component of the school’s e¤ort is instead expended once the students
are at school, and it a¤ects directly the process of learning. It is given by
the teachers’ e¤ort in the activities in the classroom, by the time they spend
outside teaching hours to prepare lessons, to assess the students’ work, to
meet parents, and so on. By its very nature, while the school’s investments
are observable by parents, they are not contractible, and so neither can
the school commit itself to a speci…c level for them prior to enrolling the
students, nor can a government agency, or indeed the parents, require the
school to make them, or agree to reward the school for undertaking them.
We capture formally the discussion in the above paragraph by letting the
variable s 2 S µ IR+ measure the school’s teaching quality and we assume
it to be given by:
s = ¹z + x, 0 < ¹ < 1, (1)
where z is the e¤ort exerted before students join the school, and x the
e¤ort exerted while students are in the school. The assumption that ¹ < 1
implies that a fraction (1 ¡ ¹) of the durable investment is directed towards
activities which do not directly a¤ect the quality of its teaching, and so do
not a¤ect directly students attainment.





error term could be added without altering the result), with all partial …rst
derivatives are positive: ceteris paribus, a student obtains a better quali…-
cation who works harder, who is abler, who receives better teaching, and
who has abler classmates. We simplify the analysis by taking the following














> 0 satis…es gs (¢) ;gµ (¢) > 0 and gss (¢);gµµ (¢) < 0. This
formulation has a very natural interpretation: a student’s quali…cation is
proportional to her individual characteristics, e¤ort and ability (note that
taking their sum amounts to little more than a normalisation). The coef-
…cient of proportionality is given by the school’s characteristics: teaching
quality si and average ability of the pupils, µi. In view of this, it is natural
to refer to g(¢) as a measure of the school’s quality.
A school pursues an objective function which depend positively on the








Á(µ)dµ ¡ ³ (x + z), (3)
where e (µ) is the e¤ort level exerted by students of ability µ. The function
³ (x + z) is increasing and convex, ³0 (¢);³00(¢) > 0, implying increasing mar-
ginal disutility of e¤ort. Additivity between the two components of e¤ort
and between the disutility of e¤ort and the students’ average quali…cation
are simplifying assumptions. In view of the functional form (2), the objective









¡ ³ (x + z) , (4)
where e is the average e¤ort exerted by the school’s students. ¸ is an impor-
tant parameter in the paper. It measures the importance of the students’
quali…cation for the school’s payo¤ relative to the cost of e¤ort. It is af-
fected by the policy instruments used by the government to provide incen-
tives to teachers, and we therefore couch our analysis in terms of the e¤ects
of changes in ¸ on the behaviour of the education system.12
12Clearly, ¸ could di¤er across schools. This creates a further source of interaction, as it
might, for example, a¤ect the types of teachers appointed by schools with di¤erent values
of ¸. This is a possible topic for further research.
7Schools choose their investment and their e¤ort. In the benchmark case,
studied in Section 3, the school takes as given the characteristics of the
students it enrols. Subsequently, in Section 4, we allow schools to a¤ect the
ability of its pupils.
2.3 The game
To sum up the description of the model, we study the following three stage
game:
² in the …rst stage, schools choose their investment, z.
² in the second stage, students and schools simultaneously and indepen-
dently choose their e¤ort levels, e and x;
² in the third stage, described and solved in the next subsection, em-
ployers observe each school leaver’s quali…cation and make her a wage
o¤er.
We study the pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game,
which in our case, implies that in each stage players correctly anticipate the
actions which will be chosen in the subsequent stages, and that employers’
beliefs about the students’ ability are consistent with the strategies employed
by the students and schools in the …rst and second stage.
2.4 Employers
The focus of our paper being on the interaction between schools and stu-
dents, we model the labour market as simply as possible. We assume that
an individual’s output in the labour market depends on the quali…cation
obtained at school and on her innate ability:
¼ (q;µ). (5)
This relationship is deterministic; adding an error term would not alter the
qualitative nature of the analysis. Moreover, there are no externalities or
economies of scale in production, so that a worker’s output does not depend
on the characteristics or the number of her fellow employees. There is a
competitive labour market, so that employers bid each worker’s wage up
until they make zero expected pro…ts from employing that worker.






where f (µ;q) 2 I R+ is the density of the representative employer’s belief
about the ability of a student whose quali…cation is q, the information avail-
able at the time that worker is hired.
We consider pure strategies only, which seems natural in the present set-
up. Therefore, all students in a given school exert the same level of e¤ort,
say ¹ e, and therefore employers can infer exactly a student’s ability from her
quali…cation; this is so because, given the school’s quality, there is a one-to-
one relationship between ability and quali…cation. It follows that f (µ;q) is
a discrete distribution, with the entire mass on a single point µ 2 £. The
requirement that the equilibrium is Bayesian implies that the employers’
beliefs about the students’ ability are consistent with the strategies employed
by the students and schools in the earlier stages, and therefore the mass point
of the employers’ belief is the true value of a student’s ability. To sum up,
for an individual with ability µ and quali…cation q from school i:









3 A benchmark case: the “monopoly school”.
In this section we study the monopoly school. This is not only a realistic
benchmark, applying as it does to all situations where the number and
characteristics of the students attending a school are exogenously given, but
it also constitutes the foundation for the study of the more general case
where schools interact with each other. Although the interaction between a
school and its students is a game with an in…nite number of players, it can
be studied in fairly simple terms, in view of the fact that students do not
know their ability and therefore behave in the same way.
Let z be …xed and known to all concerned. Consider the representative
student …rst. She takes as given the e¤ort choice of the school and of all her
fellow students, as well as correctly anticipating how employers will behave
when o¤ering wages, and she maximises her expected wage, net of the utility
cost of her e¤ort. Her maximisation problem is stated formally in the next
result.
9Lemma 1 Let e be the average e¤ort exerted by the other students. The












;e + µ ¡ e
¢
Á(µ)dµ ¡ Ã (e). (6)
Proof. The maximum wage that an employer is willing to pay to a student who

















¢ ¡ e. (8)
Substitute (7) into (8) to obtain that an employer’s inference about a student with
quali…cation q is given by e+ µ ¡e. The rest of the Lemma follows.
The lemma captures the fact that a student tries to manipulate the signal
determined by her quali…cation, by working, as it were, harder than her
colleagues. Of course, in equilibrium, every student is trying to do precisely
this, and therefore all students exert exactly the same level of e¤ort, so
that no student is in fact able to manipulate the signal provided by her
quali…cation.
The school’s decision of e¤ort is more straightforward: a school takes
the e¤ort level of the students as given, and maximises (4). The next result
characterises the Nash equilibrium of this stage of the game.
Proposition 1 The Nash equilibrium of the second stage game13 is given




g (¢)¼q ((e + µ) g(¢);µ) + ¼µ ((e + µ)g (¢);µ)
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0(x + z). (10)
Proof. Derive the best reply function of the representative student …rst. Di¤er-










13We assume that the relevant second order conditions are satis…ed. For this to be the
case, a su¢cient assumption is
















for every q 2 Q, for every µ 2 £, for every s 2 S.
10In equilibrium, e = e, and (11) becomes (9). Consider the school next: to obtain
(10) di¤erentiate (4) with respect to x, noting that the second order condition is
satis…ed, since gss (¢) < 0 and ³00(x) > 0.
The equilibrium derived in Proposition 1 can be studied with a graphical
analysis, without the consideration of explicit functional forms.
We begin by determining the e¤ect of a change in the school’s charac-
teristics on the e¤ort exerted by the representative student.
Lemma 2 If Ã00(e) >
R
µ2£ g(¢)[¼qq (¢)g(¢) + ¼µq (¢)] Á(µ) dµ, then e = e
implies de
de < 1.




























which establishes the Lemma.
Lemma 2 allows us to determine diagrammatically the equilibrium value
of e in a Cartesian diagram with e and e on the axes. Note that e (e) can be
interpreted as the best reply function of an individual student: given that
the rest of the students exert e¤ort level e, e(e) is that student’s optimal
response. At the intersection with the 45 degree line, where e = e, the
student exerts the average e¤ort level, and so every student will also do so.
When de
de < 1 the solid curve in Figure 1 intersects the 45 degree line from
below, as depicted. The condition required for the term
de
de to be less than
1 is weak: essentially it is satis…ed as long as the second cross derivative
¼qµ (¢) is not “too high”, that is, if the e¤ect of quali…cation on productivity
does not raise “too much” with ability. In what follows, we assume it to
be satis…ed. The diagram can be used to illustrate the e¤ect of a change in
the school’s characteristics, g (¢) on the e¤ort exerted by the representative
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Figure 1: The equilibrium of the game among students
The above can have either sign: if it is positive (negative), then the curve
e (e) moves up (down) as a consequence of an increase in g, as depicted by
the dashed (dotted) locus in Figure 1.
When (13) is positive, school quality and students’ e¤ort are comple-
ments. There is a kind of “multiplier” e¤ect of an increase of a school’s
quality: a better school increases the marginal bene…t of a student’s e¤ort,
making it worthwhile for her to work harder, in order to improve her signal
to the market: but, if one student works harder, then all students do. This
improvement in students’ e¤ort enhances the improvement in quali…cation
due to the increase in the schools’ teaching quality. If the sign of (13) is
negative, school quality and students’ e¤ort are substitutes: an increase in
g brings about downward shift of the curve e (e) and therefore a reduction
in students’ e¤ort. Students respond to an increase in the school quality
by reducing their own e¤ort, which (partially) o¤sets the bene…cial e¤ect of
increased quality.
This discussion, of course, only illustrates part of the story, because the
school itself responds to changes in the students’ behaviour. To study this,
consider the game between a school and its students; we derive in Lemma 3
the slope of the best reply functions of the school and the students,14 in the
(x;e) cartesian plane. We also determine the comparative statics e¤ect of
changes in the power of the incentives, which, as discussed above, we proxy
with a change in ¸, and of changes in z, the investment level determined in
14Note the slight abuse of terminology: students do not take actions in concert, and the
term “the students’ best reply function” is to be interpreted as “the equilibrium level of
e¤ort of the students as determined in the subgame where students choose e¤ort taking
the school quality as given”.
12the …rst period.
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gss (¢) ¡ ³00(x)
¢ > 0. (19)
Proof. (14), (15) and (16) areimmediate from total di¤erentiation of (11), having
substituted e = e.
With regard to the school best reply function, totally di¤erentiating the …rst





















And the rest of the Proposition follows easily.
In Figure 1, we have depicted the students’ and the school’s best reply
functions (as the solid lines). The latter (for which we give two possible
positions) is increasing, by (17); the former has slope given the sign of (14).
This is the same as the sign of de
dg(¢), the response of an individual student to
changes in the school’s characteristics, which is given in (13). It is decreasing
if school’s quality and student’s e¤ort are complements, increasing if they
are substitutes. We have drawn Figure 2 in the heuristically plausible case
in which they are complements for low values of x (and hence g (¢)) and
substitutes for higher values of x and g (¢): note that g(¢) is the coe¢cient















Figure 2: E¤ects of changesin ¸ (panel a)and z (panelb)on theNash equilibrium.
are possible.15 Panel (a) illustrates the e¤ects of an increase in ¸, the power
of the incentive schemes. From (16), we see that the students’ best reply
function does not move, and, from (19), the school responds to an increase
in ¸ with an increase in x: the best reply curve shifts up.
The e¤ect of a change in ¸ on the equilibrium depends on whether
the students’ best reply function is upward or downward sloping. If the
school’s quality and the students’ e¤ort are complements then, as shown in
the lower part of panel (a) in Figure 2, both the school’s and the students’
e¤ort increase, and so, clearly, will the average quali…cation of the stu-
dents: strengthening incentives makes teachers and students work harder
and improves results. However, if the school’s and the students’ e¤ort are
substitutes, as is the case for the higher curves in the diagram, then the
best reply function of the students is sloping backwards, and the students’
e¤ort decreases in response to an increase in ¸, and the overall e¤ect on
attainment is ambiguous.16 This is consistent with the Lavy’s empirical
15The …gure does not print the iso-utility curves, so as to avoid cluttering the diagrams.
It is however immediate to verify that both the school and the students would bene…t if
they could …nd a way to commit to higher levels of e¤ort, as shown by Correa and Gruver
(1987), irrespective of whether the school’s and the students’ e¤orts are substitutes or
complements.
16It could happen that, at their intersection, the school’s best reply function is steeper
that the students’ best reply function. In this case, an increase in ¸ would unambiguously
14…ndings (2002): he studies a policy experiment in Israeli schools, and …nds
that teachers improve their e¤ort in response to …nancial incentives, and
that students’ attainment improves as a result.
In panel (b) we consider e¤ects of changes in z, which is determined
in the …rst stage. From (18), an increase in z shifts the school’s best reply
function down, and the students’ best reply function to the left. The school’s
reduces the component x of its e¤ort; the students also reduce their e¤ort if
the school’s and the students’ e¤orts are substitutes or if, loosely speaking,
the students’ best reply function shifts less than the school’s.
To complete the analysis of the game described at the beginning of Sec-
tion 2.3, we need the determination of the variable z. This is conceptually
simple, as there are no strategic actions by the students: the school sim-






¹z + x (z);µ
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³ (x(z) + z), where the second stage variables, e and x, are themselves func-
tions of z.
4 Competition between Schools
4.1 Investment choice by schools.
To the extent that their payo¤ depends on the average quali…cation and that
the latter depends on the ability of its students, schools may rationally try
to improve their average quali…cation by recruiting abler students, if allowed
to do so.17 In this section we investigate this possibility. Speci…cally, we
assume that students (or their parents) can choose which schools to apply
for and that they make their choice on the basis of the observed values
of the schools’ characteristics; if a school is oversubscribed, it can, to some
extent, select higher ability applicants. In this subsection, the relevant school
characteristic is the value of the “investment” of the schools, namely the
decrease both the students’ and the school’s e¤ort. A brief consideration suggests however
that this equilibrium would not be “stable” under plausible adjustment mechanisms. This
possibility will be disregarded in what follows.
17This is precisely what happened in systems, such as New Zealand, where competition
was introduced. Schools try to be authorise to have an “enrolment scheme” whereby they
can establish criteria for preference in the admission of applicants. The evidence suggest
that schools attempted successfully to select pupils from socially advantaged backgrounds
(Fiske and Ladd 2000, pp 216-223). According to Fiske and Ladd “the system quickly
‡ip-‡opped in some [..] areas from one in which parents and children choose schools to
one in which schools choose students” (Fiske and Ladd 2000, p 9, our emphasis).
15component z of the school’s e¤ort, and in the next subsection the past results
obtained by the two schools. We have therefore two policy instruments: in
addition to the strength of the incentives in place for schools and teachers,
the e¤ectiveness of the competitive mechanism between schools is also clearly
a¤ected by policy decisions.
We assume that there are two schools only and that each schools’ size is
…xed to 1
2 of the total students population each. This simpli…es the analysis
and captures the main aspects of competition. The general model of Section
3 is ill suited to the analysis of situations where the distribution of individual
abilities within a school is endogenously determined. We therefore introduce
the following assumptions:
µi = ´ (zi ¡ zj), ´0 (¢) > 0, i;j = 1;2, j 6= i, (21)






µ2 + ®qµ, ½ > 0, ® 2 (¡1;1).(22)
Without explicitly modelling the process by which schools a¤ect their intake,
(21) posits a functional relationship between the di¤erence in …rst stage
investments, zi and zj, and the average ability of their intake.18 Naturally,
if a school increases its investment then it increases its average ability. Note
that (21) implies ´ (0) = µ: if the two schools invest the same amount
in stage 1, then their e¤orts cancel out and each has ability equal to the
population average. The quadratic formulation for ¼ given in (22) dovetails
neatly with (21), because of its convenient property that the students’ best
reply function depends only on the average ability and not on the entire
distribution, as is evident from direct substitution of (22) into (9), where µ
appears only linearly.
To sum up, in stage 1, schools simultaneously choose z1 and z2, thus
determining the values of the average abilities, µ1 and µ2: these are observed
by the two schools, the students, and the employers. Note that the only
18(21) implies that, in aggregate students respond continuously to changes in the dif-
ference in the schools’ characteristics. Given our assumption that students are (ex-ante)
identical, one may suppose that they would all react in the same way to exogenous changes
in the parameters of their payo¤ functions. The theoretical industrial economics literature
provides possible justi…cations for this continuous response: for example, students may be
located in di¤erent geographical areas, so that for some them going to a given school is
less convenient than for others (Hotelling 1929). Alternatively, given the interpretation of
z as marketing expenditures, the Butters (1977) model of advertising can be applied by
saying that the probability of parents getting to know about a school increases with the
school’s expenditure on “marketing”, z; if parents do not hear about a school they send
their children to the local school.
16interaction between schools takes place in stage 1: this is natural, once the
students are at schools, what happens elsewhere is irrelevant. Therefore,
in each school, once z1 and z2 are …xed, the game analysed in Section 3 is
played in isolation.















gµ (¢)´0 (0) ¡ gs (¢)(1 ¡ ¹)
¤
= 0,
for i;j = 1;2.
Proof. In the second stage, the values of zi are …xed and therefore in the …rst










































































From (21) we know that at the symmetric equilibrium, @µi
@zi = ´0(0) and from
Proposition 1 that the school’s …rst order condition in the second stage is given




gs (¢). Substituting both expressions into Wi(¢) establishes the
lemma.
The complex interaction in stage 2 described in Section 3 compounds
with the stage 1 interaction between the schools, making it intractable to
derive qualitative results (algebraically or geometrically). We therefore re-
sort to numerical simulations.19 In the present set-up the use of speci…c,
relatively simple, functional forms is a strength, not a weakness, of the
modelling strategy, as we intend to illustrate the multiplicity of possible
outcomes: with more general functional forms the ambiguity could only be
enhanced.

















where the parameters, ½, k, °, and ¾ are positive, and k < 1. In the
simulations we also restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria, where the
two schools choose the same value of their long term investment.20 This
implies that all is relevant for the determination of a symmetric equilibrium
is the slope of the function ´ when evaluated at 0, ´0 (0). A higher value
of ´0 (0) denotes a fuller response of the average ability to di¤erence in the
schools. This, clearly, is a variable that can be a¤ected by government policy,
insofar as the government can a¤ect the degree of competition, for example
by making it easier for parents to choose their school.
Table 1 illustrates a sample of the simulations. The parameters are given
by ¹ = 0:4, k = 0:9, ´0 (0) = ½ = ¾ = 1, ° = 3, and two values for ® are
considered. For ease of presentation, when a variable is decreasing it is
printed on a grey column. Table 2 illustrates that when the power of the
incentive scheme, ¸, increases, the schools shift e¤ort towards the …rst pe-
riod: recruiting high ability students becomes more important, and schools
exert more e¤ort to recruit them. This, however, increases the marginal
cost of the e¤ort exerted in the second period. Consequently, the latter is
reduced.What matters for the schools’ quality is, however, the total e¤ort
they exert, x + ¹z. This may increase or decrease with an increase in the
power of the incentives scheme, as the two parts of the Tables show. In the
upper part (with ® = ¡0:3), the school’s quality x + ¹z increases with ¸,
which more than o¤sets the decreases in students’ e¤ort e, so that every
student’s quali…cation improves (the last column in the table gives the value
for the average quali…cation). The opposite, however, may happen: the re-
duction in x brought about by the increase in z (in turn determined by the
increase in the power of incentives), combines with a reduction in e, and
as a consequence the average quali…cation is now lowered by increases in
the power of the incentive scheme. Di¤erent combinations are in general
20Again, this restriction strengthens our argument, as the e¤ect of strengthening in-
centives and increasing competition must operate only via e¤ort, and not via the average
ability of the pupils. We do consider asymmetric equilibria in the dynamic set-up of
Section 4.2.
18  l  z  x  x+mz  e  q  
a=-0.3  1.0  0.0310  0.6067  0.6191  0.2086  0.4303 
  1.6  0.6119  0.4057  0.6505  0.2067  0.4491 
  2.2  1.1678  0.2255  0.6927  0.2037  0.4739 
  2.8  1.6854  0.0759  0.7501  0.1989  0.5068 
a=0.1  0.8  0.0177  0.5541  0.5611  0.2941  0.4407 
  1.1  0.4004  0.3845  0.5447  0.2929  0.4283 
  1.4  0.7878  0.2092  0.5243  0.2913  0.4130 
  1.7  1.1813  0.0257  0.4982  0.2889  0.3932 
Table 1:  
Effects of changes in the power of incentives on the equilibrium.  
h' (0)  z  x  x+mz  e   
1.0  0.0779  0.7334  0.7646  0.5016  0.7393 
1.1  0.2801  0.5392  0.6512  0.5115  0.6434 
1.2  0.4523  0.3684  0.5493  0.5132  0.5516 
1.3  0.5942  0.2227  0.4604  0.5085  0.4683 
1.4  0.7077  0.1018  0.3849  0.4994  0.3962 
1.5  0.7968  0.0036  0.3223  0.4882  0.3361 
Table 2:  
Effects of changes in the effectiveness of competition on the equilibrium.  
possible; however, we have not found any other patterns with the functional
forms we have posited.
As Table 2 shows, the e¤ects of changes in the e¤ectiveness of competi-
tion, measured by the parameter ´0 (0), is similar to that of changes in the
power of incentives: the e¤ectiveness of the …rst period e¤ort is enhanced,
and so schools shift e¤ort in that direction. Once at school, however, there is
no e¤ect of the schools’ e¤ort, as there was in the case of increases in ¸, and,
as shown by Table 2, x decreases, and may do so to an extent su¢cient to
reduce the overall school’s quality (x + ¹z) and the average quali…cation of
the students. As before, we have not found any set of parameter displaying
a di¤erent pattern.
The exact role of each parameter in determining how the equilibrium
responds to changes in the policy parameters is less interesting than the
ambiguity in the e¤ects of these parameters: indeed, the main message of
this section is that the e¤ects on the school results of providing schools
with incentives and of making competition more e¤ective relationship are
potentially perverse. At the very least, our analysis casts doubts on the
19belief that incentives are per se e¤ective.
4.2 A simple dynamic model of school competition.
One of the main reasons why parents prefer a school over another is because
its exam results are better; this suggests a simple natural dynamic extension
of our model, one where today’s demand for places at a school is a¤ected by
yesterday’s results.21
Formally, we assume that time is divided into periods, and that, in each
period, the average ability of the pupils enrolled at school i depends on the
di¤erence between the average quali…cation obtained by the students at the
two schools in the previous period. This variable plays therefore the same
role played by the z component of the school’s investment, and, for the sake
of simplicity, z is set to 0: a school’s intake is only a¤ected by past results.
Formally, in period t, t = 1;2;:::, the average ability of the students who are
enrolled in school i, µ1;t, is given by an increasing function of the di¤erence
in the schools’ average examination results:
µ1;t = h (¹ q1;t¡1 ¡ ¹ q2;t¡1),
where ¹ qi;t¡1 is the average quali…cation of the students attending school i in
period t ¡1. As with ´, we have h(0) = µ; we also have h(y)+h (¡y) = 2µ.





denote the reduced form average quali…cation of the students
























are the reduced form e¤ort levels exerted in equi-
librium by students and the school when the average ability in the school is
21Indeed the publications of school’s league tables in the UK has been the main source of
information for parents of prospective pupils, and one that has clearly a¤ected the intake
in many schools.
22That is, decision makers in schools have a discount factor of 0. This allows us to treat
each period as a separate game, and eliminates the possibility of equilibria of the repeated
game based on trigger strategies. We feel justi…ed in this assumption by the fact that
the focus of this paper is on the interaction between schools, and not on the role of time
preferences on the behaviour of schools. Since such preference are likely to be important
in practice, because teachers may stay in a school for longer than a cohort of students,
further research should take rigorously into account the possibility that the interaction
between schools is best described by a repeated game.
20µi (given by the solution of (9) and (10)). In period t, the average ability of












µ2;t = 2µ ¡ µ1;t. (29)
Note that µ1;t = µ = µ2;t is always a steady state solution of the dynamical
system (28). Whether this solution is locally stable depends in general







Therefore, if Q0 ¡
µ
¢
6 0, that is if an increase in the average ability brings
about lower schools and/or students’ e¤ort which more than compensates for
the increase in average ability, the symmetric equilibrium, µ1;t¡1 = µ2;t¡1 =
µ, is locally stable. If, however, Q0 ¡
µ
¢
> 0, that is if an increase in the
average ability of a school’s intake brings about an increase of the aver-
age quali…cation, then, for Q0 ¡
µ
¢
and/or h0(0) high enough, the symmetric
equilibrium is not stable. In this case, if there are stable equilibria, they are
asymmetric. Since we are interested in …nding examples of these equilibria,
we are again justi…ed in restricting the analysis to the functional forms used
in the previous sections, (22) and (25)-( 27). In addition, we also assume
that the function h is given by







While unusual, (30), depicted in Figure 3, constitutes a natural choice. The
ability distribution determines the average ability in the two schools in the
event of complete segregation by ability, when all the students whose ability
is above the median are in one school. These are denoted by µmax and µmin,
and (30) implies that these can be reached only as the di¤erence between the
average quali…cations in the two schools tends to 1. The only parameter
of this adjustment function is therefore ±, which measures the speed with
which parents respond to past di¤erence in results. Figure 3 illustrates this
function for two values of ± (the dashed line denotes the higher speed of
adjustment).
21l  1 q   2 q  
1 q   2 q   x1  x2  e1  e2 
     Table 3a:   a = 0.1, d = 10, r = 0.3, k = 0.9, s = 10, g = 10 
1  0.0585  0.0585  0.5000  0.5000  0.0536  0.0536  0.0953  0.0953 
2  0.0883  0.0883  0.5000  0.5000  0.1080  0.1080  0.1000  0.1000 
3  0.1759  0.0731  0.6272  0.3728  0.1975  0.1288  0.1043  0.1043 
4  0.2443  0.0789  0.6635  0.3365  0.2779  0.1599  0.1086  0.1076 
5  0.3102  0.0877  0.6828  0.3172  0.3577  0.1926  0.1122  0.1107 
6  0.3751  0.0980  0.6949  0.3051  0.4374  0.2261  0.1151  0.1137 
7  0.4392  0.1091  0.7032  0.2968  0.5168  0.2604  0.1171  0.1165 
     Table 3b:   a = -0.6, d = 10, r = 0.9, k = 0.9, s = 5, g = 3 
1.5  0.1514  0.1514  0.5000  0.5000  0.1871  0.1871  0.1930  0.1930 
1.55  0.1555  0.1550  0.5008  0.4992  0.1935  0.1932  0.1927  0.1933 
1.6  0.1709  0.1476  0.5365  0.4635  0.2059  0.1931  0.1786  0.2069 
1.65  0.1798  0.1467  0.5510  0.4490  0.2149  0.1965  0.1726  0.2124 
1.7  0.1876  0.1468  0.5616  0.4384  0.2233  0.2004  0.1681  0.2166 
1.75  0.1948  0.1476  0.5702  0.4298  0.2314  0.2046  0.1642  0.2199 
2  0.2267  0.1549  0.5991  0.4009  0.2697  0.2276  0.1500  0.2314 
3  0.3299  0.2000  0.6456  0.3544  0.4105  0.3272  0.1146  0.2516 
4  0.4133  0.2505  0.6623  0.3377  0.5394  0.4293  0.0868  0.2585 
5  0.4821  0.3010  0.6697  0.3303  0.6581  0.5306  0.0615  0.2593 
6  0.5390  0.3497  0.6726  0.3274  0.7678  0.6299  0.0382  0.2559 
7  0.5864  0.3956  0.6732  0.3268  0.8694  0.7263  0.0169  0.2496 
Table 3:  
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Figure 3: A school’s average ability as a function of the di¤erence in investement
Table 3 illustrates the stable equilibrium for two sets of simulations,
where ¸ increases in each set for the given values of the other parameters.







, and running the dynamical system until the di¤erence
between the ability in each school in successive time periods was below a
preset threshold.
A pattern common to all the simulations we have ran is that, as ¸ in-
creases, the symmetric equilibrium ceases to be stable: increasing the power




Figure  4:  Value  of  the  average  quali…cation  in  the  two  schools
rium, an increase in ¸ makes it worthwhile for the better school to increase
e¤ort; this increases its average quali…cation, and so its attractiveness to
students. Given our model speci…cation, the e¤ects is stronger for the bet-
ter school, although it is conceivable that the opposite might be the case.
The e¤ects on e¤ort are ambiguous. In Table 3a an increase in ¸ increases
the e¤orts of both schools and the e¤ort of the students in both schools.
Notice also that students and teachers work harder in the better school. In
the lower part of the Table, the e¤ect on e¤ort is ambiguous: as ¸ increases,
teachers work harder in the better school while students work less hard. The
same is true in the lower ability school, when the incentives are su¢ciently
powerful.
Note also that, when ¸ is such that the schools are not very di¤erent in
intake, an increase in ¸ has opposite e¤ects on the quali…cation of the two
schools: the “better” school responds to an increase in ¸ with an improve-
ment in the quali…cation, the other school with a reduction (in Table 3b this
happens for a smaller range of values for ¸). This pattern is illustrated in
Figure 4 which shows the average quali…cation in the two schools as a func-
tion of ¸, and is caused by the reduction in the average ability of the intake,
accompanied by the possible reduction in the school’s e¤ort illustrated in
the seventh column in Table 3b.
In Table 4 we consider the e¤ects of changes in ±, the e¤ectiveness of







is stable. As ± increases, small initial di¤er-
23d  1 q   2 q  
1 q   2 q   x1  x2  e1  e2 
      Table 4a:   a = 0.1, l = 5, r = 0.3, k = 0.5, s = 10, g = 5 
3  0.2490  0.2490  0.5000  0.5000  0.1824  0.1824  0.2296  0.2296 
5  0.3577  0.1583  0.6247  0.3753  0.2134  0.1505  0.2287  0.2269 
7  0.4058  0.1274  0.6745  0.3255  0.2254  0.1376  0.2272  0.2249 
9  0.4267  0.1154  0.6954  0.3046  0.2304  0.1321  0.2263  0.2240 
      Table 4b:   a = 1, l = 5, r = 0.3, k = 0.5, s = 10, g = 5 
3  0.2857  0.2857  0.5000  0.5000  0.2031  0.2031  0.3125  0.3125 
5  0.4705  0.1485  0.6615  0.3385  0.2563  0.1515  0.3637  0.2677 
7  0.5130  0.1268  0.6936  0.3064  0.2670  0.1416  0.3744  0.2598 
9  0.5332  0.1174  0.7084  0.2916  0.2720  0.1370  0.3794  0.2563 
      Table 4c:   a = 0.1, l = 5, r = 0.9, k = 0.5, s = 10, g = 5 
3  0.2235  0.2235  0.5000  0.5000  0.1674  0.1674  0.1696  0.1696 
5  0.2922  0.1632  0.5912  0.4088  0.1876  0.1468  0.1592  0.1784 
7  0.3497  0.1232  0.6604  0.3396  0.2026  0.1309  0.1499  0.1842 
9  0.3723  0.1096  0.6863  0.3137  0.2081  0.1250  0.1462  0.1862 
      Table 4d:   a = 0.1, l = 5, r = 0.9, k = 0.5, s = 10, g = 0.7 
5  0.7204  0.7204  0.5000  0.5000  0.4001  0.4001  1.1006  1.1006 
7  0.7972  0.6335  0.6358  0.3642  0.3890  0.4094  0.9200  1.2735 
9  0.8158  0.6088  0.6716  0.3284  0.3858  0.4114  0.8715  1.3174 
11  0.8251  0.5960  0.6899  0.3101  0.3841  0.4124  0.8466  1.3395 
      Table 4e:   a = 0.1, l = 5, r = 0.6, k = 0.3, s = 10, g = 0.8 
2  0.6992  0.6992  0.5000  0.5000  0.2473  0.2473  1.1484  1.1484 
4  0.8803  0.5016  0.6571  0.3429  0.2472  0.2410  0.9910  1.2635 
6  0.9216  0.4518  0.6957  0.3043  0.2464  0.2382  0.9472  1.2840 
8  0.9380  0.4314  0.7115  0.2885  0.2460  0.2370  0.9288  1.2915 
Table 4:  
Effects of changes in the effectiveness on the equilibrium of the dynamic game.  
ences are ampli…ed, and the better school becomes better, increasing both
average ability of the intake and average quali…cation. The other school
becomes worse both in terms of intake and of quali…cations. Competition
generates segregation.23
What seems to drive the students’ attainment in the two schools, how-
ever, is the change in intake, as the wide variety of patterns which emerges
with regard to e¤ort would suggest. This is shown in the last four columns
of Table 4. Of particular interest is the set of parameters given in Table
4d. Here results improve in school 1 and worsen in school 2 as competition
becomes more e¤ective, despite that fact that students and teachers work
more in the weaker school and less in the better school, and indeed both the
students and the school work harder in the weaker school.
23This conclusion is in line with the empirical analysis of Bradley and Taylor (2002),
who …nd that, in the UK, where recent reforms have increased parental choice with regard
to the school attended by their children, have also led to higher segregation of pupils.
245 Concluding remarks.
The paper analyses the e¤ects of incentives in the education sector and
competition between education institutions. A school’s results depend on
the school’s investment and the school’s teaching e¤ort, both of which are
directly a¤ected by the incentives provided to schools, and by the students’
e¤ort in learning.
The main messages of the paper are simply put: incentives may back-
…re and competition may have perverse e¤ects. This is due to the strategic
interaction among the participants in the education process. For example,
students may reduce their e¤ort when teachers increase theirs. This may
dampen the e¤ect of increases in the power of incentives on the results.
When schools interact with one another, their attempts to attract the bet-
ter students further blurs the relationship between agents, to the point, as
we show with robust and plausible functional forms and parameter combi-
nations, that increases in the power of incentives and the e¤ectiveness of
competition may reduce the students’ attainment. To the exent that incen-
tives are coslty, our analysis may be interpreted as providing a theoretical
underpinning for the ambiguous relationship between resources and result
which some literature has identi…ed (e.g., Hanushek 1986). At the very least,
our paper illustrates the importance of further theoretical research to clarify
the interaction between schools and students.
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